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Introduction
Ethno-territorial rights have improved greatly since the 1990s in many parts of Latin America. 
In this article we study how the extractivist booms of the late 2000s have challenged these 
established rights.1 There are new constitutional frameworks protecting these rights. Our 
focus is on studying their role: do constitutions matter or not in the face of a major resource 
rush? The new constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador are thus far possibly the most radical 
constitutions in the world, both in the field of recognising Indigenous grievances, such as 
legal pluralism, territorial autonomy and collective rights, and in declaring the state to be 
intercultural and pluri-national;2 similarly they declare the ‘rights of nature’, ie the consti-
tutional protection of the environment/Mother Nature/Pachamama.3 Nonetheless, as we 
show, neither the ratification of ILO-169 on the rights of Indigenous peoples nor progressive 
constitutional reform guarantees that Indigenous and other ethnic land rights are given 
priority over mining, logging, pasture-land, industrial plantation expansion, oil extraction, 
or similar industrial extractivisms.
By ethnic (ethno/Indigenous) territorial rights, we refer to territories controlled by self-iden-
tified indigenous (ethnically defined) people or groups, afro-descendants (quilombola 
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communities, etc) and traditional populations (eg seringueiros and quebradeiras de coco), 
not including peasant or other non-ethnic territorial rights. We also include the rights of 
Bolivian peasant-indigenous peoples, even though many of these individuals and collectives 
prefer to identify as peasants.4
We ask whether and how constitutional reforms matter. Through the analysis of illustra-
tive cases of clashes between ethno-territorial rights and extractive activities, we examine 
different de jure and de facto-settings in Latin America. Instead of a traditional comparative 
study, specific but crucial cases are examined in order to highlight possible inconsistencies 
between de jure and de facto rights. We provide a region-wide comparison. Our analysis con-
solidates many existing claims and provides a more consistent look at the key dimensions 
of the debate on the relation between de facto and de jure rights.
We also contribute to the scholarship on South–South relations, showing how these 
deepening interactions can also be implicit. The challenges experienced by the region were 
globally defined (neoliberalism in the 1990s, extractive impetus in the late 2000s), and solu-
tions were mostly homebred in Latin America. We study the transnational processes to the 
extent that these mattered and explain their roots by looking at domestic and local struggles.
Activist citizens and collectives in Latin America present a long history of linkages to 
transnational politics. The recent constitutional reforms had transnational roots, while their 
implementation was national.5 The transnational sources of national politics and policies 
have indirectly (albeit crucially) affected the outcome of the struggles of recognition that 
contributed to the reinforcement of ethno-territorial rights.
 The creation of the new constitutional rights was largely motivated by constant pres-
sure from increasingly powerful and state-embedded social movements, which started 
to create region-wide networks in the 1980s. These region-wide social movements 
included the Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon River Basin (COICA), 
founded in 1984, which coordinates nine national Indigenous organisations, and the Latin 
American Coordinating Board of Rural Organizations (CLOC), which is a member of La Via 
Campesina and an important networker between Indigenous and broader rural groups. 
Besides pushing for de jure rights, La Via Campesina, CLOC and their member organisations’ 
concerted cooperation has been decisive in the struggle for constitutional reform and mak-
ing ethno-territorial rights a de facto reality, independently of constitutional backing. The 
People′s Global Action (PGA) – a transnational network of the Global Justice Movement – is 
another important radical and anti-capitalist organisation that since 1997 has challenged the 
global governance institutions. Ecuadorian and Bolivian Indigenous organisations have col-
laborated with the PGA on issues of territories, water, ethnically defined rights, and resistance 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the (Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), for 
example during the third international encounter of PGA in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2001.6
 The new ethno-territorial rights have from the start been a globally attuned project. The 
ILO-169 had a far-reaching impact on the continent and inspired the constitutional texts of 
several countries.7 Indeed, ethnically defined groups were successful in the promotion of 
the convention and 13 Latin American countries ratified the document between 1990 and 
2002.8 The nexus of progressive constitutions and increased territorial rights of ethnically 
marginalised populations that base their livelihoods on traditional territorial occupation 
of land formed two major processual changes that have swept across Latin America in the 
past three decades. First, the ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ of the 1990s put identity-based 
movements into the limelight.9 Second, the more recent wave of neo-constitutionalism 
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characterised by the expansion and deepening of ethnically defined rights, particularly on 
behalf of the current progressive governments in Ecuador and Bolivia, led to increased state 
protection of marginal collective identities that gained better land rights.10 Track records 
vary on how well the new ethno-territorial rights, and the new constitutional frameworks 
amounting to a de jure protection of rights, have been respected de facto, but they show a 
shared pressure by governments to tap nature’s bounty.
We will discuss some recent scenarios of extractive industries in relation to the political 
turn to the Left in Latin America and the experiments in post-neoliberal or even post-devel-
opmentalist politico-economic state projects on the continent,11 that is, the recent wave of 
Latin American neo-constitutionalism.12 This political change towards the so-called Leftist 
wave, or progressive governments, has characterised several countries, such as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, uruguay and Venezuela. The new administrations have different 
styles, ranging from more radical postures (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador) to more moderate 
ones (Argentina, Brazil, uruguay). However, all of them display the return of a more active 
state and contribute to new understandings of developmentalism. Particular attention will 
be paid to two of the countries associated with the political banner of 21st-century social-
ism – Bolivia and Ecuador – as well as to Brazil, the globally most significant Latin American 
case. We will also discuss Chile, Colombia, Mexico and, very briefly, Venezuela.
21st-century socialism
Latin America’s ‘21st-century socialism’ and Leftist transformation – which can be understood 
as a reflection of discontent with neoliberalism – was initiated by the election of Hugo Chávez 
Frías in Venezuela in 1998, soon followed by Leftist movements achieving executive power 
in Brazil, Argentina, uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador and other parts of Latin America. In Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Ecuador constitutional reform was already the principal proposal during the 
campaigns and popular movement activities of the 1990s that led to the Leftist transition.
The Bolivian ratification of the ILO-169 in 1991 was a reflection of a mobilisation by the 
lowland Indigenous organisation Confederation of Bolivian Indigenous Peoples (CIdOB) 
in 1990 under the banner, ‘March for Territory and dignity’. However, the practical imple-
mentation of ILO-169 and the more extended right to prior consultation on hydrocarbon 
activities in Bolivia was delayed until 2007, ie after the presidential inauguration of Evo 
Morales.13 This is a crucial example of the historical roots of the constitutional reforms as 
regards the reinforcement of ethnic and territorial rights. It is also a clear example of an 
extended cycle of contention in which social movements’ grievances of the 1990s achieved 
recognition decades later.14 Since the 1990s CIdOB and other Indigenous organisations have 
been increasingly active in transnational networks.
Ecuador presents a similar historical pattern of social mobilisation among Indigenous 
organisations and transnational activism to achieve recognition of ethnic and territorial 
rights. deborah yashar has illustrated how Amazonian Indigenous people were particularly 
successful in negotiating territorial autonomy in the 1990s. An example was the Ecuadorian 
Organización de los Pueblos Indígenas del Pastaza (OPIP), which achieved large territorial 
gains for their communities.15 Importantly and interestingly these movement’s victories were 
achieved without the judicial platform (or national political opportunity) of a ‘progressive’ 
constitution as regards ethno-territorial rights. These achievements were undoubtedly the 
results of a combination of local Indigenous movement struggle and transnational activism 
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– leaning on ILO-169 and the ‘relatively ethno-friendly’ global atmosphere associated with 
neoliberal multiculturalism. This historical case suggests that contentious agency and the 
transnational setting are more important in explaining ethno-territorial rights than national 
policies: the progressive constitutions enshrined in the 2000s allow for the studying of this 
claim comparatively here.
In Ecuador’s constitutional reform of 1997–98 the Indigenous movement – spearheaded by 
the Ecuadorian Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities (Confederación de Nacionalidades 
Indígenas del Ecuador, CONAIE) and its politico-electoral movement Pachakutik – were 
clearly inspired by the recent constitutional modifications in Bolivia, and they achieved 
some important recognition of collective grievances.16 The National Federation of Peasant, 
Indigenous and Black Organisations (Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas, 
Indígenas y Negras, FENOCIN) has been a central ally of the government of Rafael Correa 
since 2007. FENOCIN is a member of CLOC and La Via Campesina and has been active in the 
constitutional reforms of 1997–98 and 2008, particularly as regards issues of Indigenous 
and Afro-Ecuadorian collective rights. Many popular and cross-Latin America organisations 
were highly active in the recent processes of rewriting the constitution in Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and (in the 1980s) Brazil.
Increased South–South and intra-continental cooperation have characterised the region 
even more after the establishment of the Leftist governments, and has included the advance-
ment of ethno-territorial social movements struggling on transnational and global levels. 
different intra-continental organisations have emerged, such as ALBA-TCP, unasur and 
CELAC, in order to strengthen the Latin American countries vis-à-vis the Global North.17 
The new socialist projects are consequently both nationalist and internationalist.18
Some common characteristics of the ‘progressive governments’ are: a strengthened role 
and presence of the state in the economy and in society; a reduction in poverty; recogni-
tion of traditionally marginalised sectors of society; nationalisation of strategic industries; 
and stronger governmental steering of key companies.19 Through state control of strate-
gic (mainly hydrocarbon) industries, revenues are redistributed more fairly in society, on 
other words benefiting marginalised sectors, although there is still a very long way to go to 
make the model less elite-based.20 Our discussion of the ills of extractivism illustrates how 
this state-level South–South process challenging the global North has affected minority 
populations.
Table 1. The de jure and de facto division of ethno-territorial rights: examples from latin america.
Note: in this text we refer exclusively to the three blocks of yasuní territory labelled yasuní-iTT, which were the subject of 
the progressive initiative to leave the oil in the soil. oil drilling has been carried out for many years in other parts of the 
yasuní territory.
Ethno-territorial rights (with 
examples) De facto
De jure yes No
yes TiPNiS (until 2015), Bolivia; 
raposa/Serra do Sol, and 
reSeX Tapajós-arapiuns, 
Brazil; yasuní (until 2013),a 
ecuador 
Belo Monte, Brazil; afro-Co-
lombians, West Colombia; 
yasuní (after 2013)
No Chiapas, Zapatistas, 
Mexico
Mapuche, Southern Chile
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De facto and de jure ethno-territorial rights
We will seek answers to the question of the relative importance of constitutional reform 
for the recognition of ethno-territorial rights by analysing different cases. Cases defined 
as having de jure ethno-territorial rights were based on having constitutional frameworks 
that recognise Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization of 1989 (ILO-169), 
without significant contradictory laws or practices of law that contradict it. For this reason, 
we do not consider Chile’s treatment of the Mapuche to fulfil the de jure or de facto categories 
of ethno-territorial rights.
De facto rights are defined by the actual territorial absence of large-scale extraction pro-
jects which the local people resist and consider a violation of their ethno-territorial rights, 
eg the absence of a large open-pit mine causing severe socio-environmental damage in a 
studied sub-area of a country (such as the Mexican territory controlled by the Zapatistas). 
We will examine cases of:
•  Both de facto and de jure rights largely (not necessarily completely) protected (eg TIPNIS 
in Bolivia (until 2015) and yasuní (until 2013), both in Ecuador).
•  De facto rights to a considerable degree, but relatively no constitutional rights (eg 
Zapatistas, Chiapas, Mexico); this includes groups who have attained de facto rights 
despite the absence of progressive constitutional ethno-territorial rights.
•  Harsh violations of de facto rights, in spite of having de jure rights (e.g. Belo Monte dam 
project, Brazil; Afro-Colombian territories on the West Coast of Colombia). This category 
may include pockets of domination and land grabbing based on physical violence. Such 
a case is Colombia, whose 1991 Constitution established celebrated ethno-territorial 
rights, although these were countered by state-supported paramilitary violence.
•  Harsh violations of de facto rights and absence of considerable de jure rights (e.g. the 
Mapuche people in forestry areas of Southern Chile).
These cases are summarised in Table 1, which will function as the organising framework of 
the analysis.
 The study is based on participant observation and field research in Latin America, par-
ticularly in Ecuador and Bolivia between 2010 and 2015, and in Brazil in 2004–14, and is sup-
plemented by reviews of documents. The method of finding extremes and comparing them 
was used, and accompanied by more comprehensive comparison, after the main categories 
(above) were identified through triangulation. The following questions guide the analysis:
•  How have the new constitutions changed the territorial rights/recognition of the 
Indigenous/other ethnic group in areas affected by resource exploitation?
•  Considering the expansion of extractive industries, how are (the implementation of ) 
state policies justified by the central government?
•  Are there contradictions in the new constitutional texts (and secondary legislation)?
The final question is the point of departure for our study, in that the ‘progressive’ consti-
tutions include contradictions and in practice clashes between the recognition of (ethnic 
and territorial) rights and the rights of the state to commercialise natural resources for the 
common good.21
 Table 1 can also be used to study capitalist land rights, producing a similar table for such 
rights (de jure and de facto). The discrepancies between the distribution of de facto and de jure 
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capitalist and ethno-territorial land rights offer strong empirical support for inequality. We 
hypothesise that the contents of Table 1 (as presented above) can be more or less inverted 
for capitalist land rights. For example, in the Mapuche territory, capitalists have both de facto 
and de jure land rights (while Mapuche have neither), while in the Extractive units of Brazil, 
capitalist land rights are curtailed both de facto and de jure.
Progressive (neo-)extractivism and the Latin American ‘brown left’
The positive de facto outcomes in Table 1 are a product of contentious agency spreading on 
a continental scale – the movements involved in the cases discussed are well aware of each 
other and actively network.22 The several positive de jure outcomes in Table 1, on the other 
hand, suggest that the creation of new ethno-territorial rights is also a ‘top-level’ official pol-
icy cooperative project: this process can be called a parcel of ‘progressive constitutionalism’. 
Both of these outcomes have common roots as well as shared dynamics and impulses – as 
does the Latin American extractivism of the progressive governments.23 However, the civil 
society and popular movement processes of South–South cooperation have been a neces-
sary and prior condition in order for later state-based cooperation on progressive lines to 
take place – new movements brought people into power that listened to the movements’ 
demands, and shared the local views with foreign colleagues in the state.
With the advent of high commodity prices and strong international pressure from rising 
powers in the global South – particularly China, and more recently Brazil in the case of Latin 
America – this development of ethno-territorial rights both outside and within the state has 
been sidelined. The progressive governments have jumped on the extraordinary opportu-
nity to use the new ‘commodity paradigm’ of huge price increases to gain windfall gains by 
massive increases in resource exports.
In Bolivia the government of Evo Morales has continuously argued that the state should 
have control over extractive industries, in order to achieve economic development and to 
siphon off the financial proceeds for socioeconomic welfare reforms. The Morales adminis-
tration also instituted radical legal reforms regarding both human rights and environmental 
criteria in the hydrocarbon sector. These advances, including the recognition of rights in 
the 2009 Constitution, were the result of decades of grassroots struggle, mainly by lowland 
Indigenous peoples.
However, economist Pablo dávalos, among others, refers critically to these changes as 
‘progressive neo-extractivism’, characterised by a stronger role and presence of the state in 
extractive industries. The progressive trait, and the legitimation, of this extractivist model 
is the usage of the revenues for state social programmes, mainly in education and health.24 
In theory, even though extractive projects may threaten territorial rights, at the same time 
the social reforms will generally benefit the Indigenous peoples and other marginalised 
groups. The progressive condition of this development style is legitimated through repeated 
references to the need for extractivist activities to generate the necessary funding to attack 
poverty and finance other social programmes. Progressive governments have expanded and 
deepened economic assistance programmes, particularly conditional cash transfers. Social 
ecologist Eduardo Gudynas argues that neo-extractivism in these countries can be under-
stood as the emergence of a ‘brown left’, which is less red and particularly less green than it 
presents itself. yet, this ‘new’ left is more progressive than prior governments, particularly in 
the sense of providing broader socioeconomic benefits to marginalised groups.25
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 An increasing number of conflicts have accompanied this development policy, which 
promotes two models of development that are difficult to merge into a coherent whole. In a 
sense the new development policy of the ‘brown left’ has entered into conflict with the new 
constitutions, some of which were based on the mobilisation of those who put the new Left 
into power. Currently,, in its myriad of localised and seemingly distinct local land struggles, 
Latin America is witnessing a general battle between the ‘brown left’ in power and a new, 
emerging ‘green left’ at a grassroots power level.
 One variation of this Latin American ‘green left’ tide are the buen vivir and Sumak Kawsay/
Suma Qamaña platforms of several Indigenous Andean populations. Buen vivir is an onto-
logically distinct cosmology and way of ecologically sustainable and harmonious life in 
comparison to modernist and capitalist projects such as progressive and/or extractive gov-
ernments.26 The states of Bolivia and Ecuador have recently embraced buen vivir and cod-
ified this into law, but green left activists such as Gudynas argue that they have distorted 
the original radical idea, since extractivism is a modernist process deeply at odds with the 
traditional cosmologies.27
 The progressive constitutions gave space for a green left to consolidate its position, but the 
brown left has found this problematic, as its core is the use of extractivism as a political-economic 
model of development to increase their power and address the problems that the traditional 
Left has confronted. Perhaps most visibly Brazil has, since about 2010, taken a very controversial 
path. The forest code was radically deregulated by parliament, and in many (but not all) places 
Indigenous and other marginalised rural populations have borne the brunt of an extractivism 
even more vigorous than that of the 1970s authoritarian regime, in terms of building new dams 
such as the Belo Monte, and of displacing local people.
Do constitutions matter?
Why were the new constitutions unable to fully secure (de facto) land rights in the face of this 
extractivist boom? To answer this question, both Latin American South–South cooperation 
and the progressive constitutions created through this process should be studied from a 
longer historical perspective, in which the 19th-century Latin American liberal constitution-
alism still bears a strong path-dependent legacy for constitution making and implemen-
tation. This history helps explain why the seemingly radical new constitutions are in fact 
rather moderate when compared with de facto rights. Their basis is still in liberal law, which 
in Latin America implies that many laws are still made ‘for the English to see’, as the popular 
saying goes in Brazil.28
However, the progressive (or partly progressive) constitutions’ ethno-territorial rights 
sections, such as the part of Brazil’s 1988 constitution demanding the full demarcation of 
traditional Indigenous lands, have for the most part been followed, with most Indigenous 
lands having now been officially recognised.29 For other ethno-territorial groups, such as 
the Afro-Brazilian quilombola communities, however, the situation is not so good, as only 
about 5% of the self-identified quilombolas have received land rights: for officially recog-
nised quilombolas the figure is much higher, and half of all self-identified communities have 
received an official certificate (but not necessarily land titles).30 Another question is whether 
the new de jure rights are confirmed de facto in real practice.
 In Brazil between 2004 and 2011, Indigenous lands were sanctioned to correspond to 
20% of the Amazon territories, and 15 million hectares of Extractive units for traditional 
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populations were created.31 In total, these endeavours have placed over 40% of the Amazon 
region under some sort of official protection, with 60% of these lands under socioambien-
talismo, ie they are governed by locals. Socioambientalismo is one of the results of a broader 
cross-Latin American networking and ideology-building process by rural social movements, 
initiated with the end of the dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s. Socioambientalismo was 
the key in fostering the partly progressive constitution of 1988 and later, in the 2000s, in 
gaining political power in the Brazilian parliament for some supporters of socioambiental-
ismo, such as Marina Silva and Lula.32
 Notwithstanding this, in an influential study of Indigenous people’s rights amid Latin 
America’s new constitutionalism, Van Cott emphasises the relatively weak position of Brazil 
in comparison to other Latin American countries in terms of ethnically defined rights.33 
However, Brazil has been highly successful in pioneering ethno-territorial rights for non-in-
digenous rural populations. The ethno-territorial rights of extractive populations were legally 
established after the Chico Mendes-led Rubber Tappers’ Movement successfully halted the 
expansion of illegal logging and pasturelands in many parts of the Amazon at the turn of 
the 1980s and 1990s. The success of this process was dependent on transnational activ-
ism, which pressured the state to fulfil the demands of its new constitution.34 New instru-
ments were created after this struggle. Most importantly, they included Multiple-purpose 
Conservation Areas, where different traditional extractive populations could live while safe-
guarding nature (these and other similar social natures are labelled socioambientalismos 
among Latin American movements and academics). These have been very important in 
extending the reach of ethno-territorial rights in Brazil,35 where in many cases, people are 
caboclos, that is, they have ethnically mixed identities.
In the Amazon, as one of the authors of this article has observed, since 2005 in the case 
of Extractive unit (Reserva Extrativista, Resex) Tapajós-Arapiuns, the majority of the popu-
lation living within the forested territory did not self-identify as Indigenous, although their 
way of life was otherwise almost indistinguishable from the few Indigenous self-identified 
villages in the area. It was more preferable for them to identify as traditional populations 
with an Extractive unit than with an Indian Land (which they most probably would not have 
attained). These examples illustrate how the story does not end with Indigenous populations, 
and also that Brazil’s constitution of 1988, and subsequent amendments, have allowed for 
a de jure recognition of ethno-territorial rights.
Extractivism clashing with ethno-territorial rights
We will next discuss the exemplary cases in Table 1 to illustrate how constitutions matter 
and do not matter in the context of a ‘commodity paradigm’ and of progressive states that 
have contradictory clauses on such rights.
TIPNIS
One of the most emblematic cases of the clash between ethno-territorial rights and economic 
development politics is that of TIPNIS in Bolivia. Between August and October 2011 a huge 
number of Indigenous and other activists marched for 65 days from the Bolivian lowlands to 
the capital protesting against a highway construction project through a protected area and 
Indigenous territories, the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS).36 
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The 602 km highway project would connect the lowland Beni department with highland 
Cochabamba – it would be a key project of Latin American integration by the new progressive 
governments following the commodity-export strategy, and Brazil was heavily involved in 
pushing for the road as a way to reach Pacific markets faster.37 The protesters presented a 
list of 16 demands concerning respect for the territory, as well as other social, economic and 
cultural concerns. After violent clashes between police forces and the marchers President 
Morales agreed to all their demands. However, after a few months, the highway project 
was reinitiated, despite heavy resistance and international media and academic coverage.38
However, the TIPNIS conflict suddenly ended – at least temporarily – in a rather strange 
way. In January 2014 local academics and activists were evidently surprised by some dec-
larations (as quoted in the local mass media on 4 January) by Vice President Álvaro García 
Linera regarding the destiny of the TIPNIS highway in June 2013 at a conference in Argentina, 
ie half a year before. García Linera admitted several mistakes committed by the government 
over the construction project and in its communication with affected Indigenous groups. He 
emphasised that the highway would be necessary but that it had to be postponed 20, 50 or 
100 years and that consideration should be given to the protection of the environment.39 
during interviews carried out in La Paz in January and February 2014 even government 
officials confirmed that construction of the highway had been cancelled.
Nevertheless, the government’s position rapidly altered after the presidential elections 
of October 2014. In June 2015 Evo Morales drafted and established a presidential decree 
(2.366) that radically changed the rules of the political game in the protected areas (natural 
reserves), some of which are also Indigenous territories. Morales argued that the national 
parks had been established by elite groups in Bolivia and beyond as a kind of standby sup-
ply of natural resources. State authorities are planning to initiate oil drilling in eight of the 
existing 22 protected areas of the nation.40 According to the superior decree 2.366, all the 
hydrocarbon resources located in the nation could be exploited and commercialised for the 
common good (social welfare and poverty reduction).41
 Furthermore, vice-president García Linera announced that there should be a legal modifi-
cation of the statute on the ‘untouchability’ of TIPNIS,42 which was one of the central achieve-
ments of the Indigenous march for TIPNIS. In the table, TIPNIS is placed in the field of both 
de jure and de facto rights only until 2015, as the position is likely to be change in the near 
future, given the above shifts in the government stance.
Yasuní-ITT 
The yasuní territory of the Northern Ecuadorian Amazon is a protected national park and 
biosphere reserve, with some of the richest biodiversity in the world. It is also the home of 
several Indigenous groups, some of whom live in voluntary isolation. But yasuní-ITT is also a 
territory of unexploited oil riches. In 2007, with the slogan of ‘Leaving the oil underground’ 
Ecuador asked the international community for 50% of the income that would have been 
generated from oil exploitation, in order to protect the biodiversity and the Indigenous 
peoples of the area. The initial compromise was to leave roughly 850 million barrels of oil 
underground without time limits. Moreover, the constitution of 2008 gave further protection 
to the national park and the Indigenous peoples.
The yasuní initiative as a rejection of hydrocarbon capitalism dates back many years. In 
1995 the Indigenous Confederation CONAIE demanded the suspension of oil drilling in the 
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yasuní national park. Later the proposal was developed among academics and different envi-
ronmentally related civil society groups, such as Oilwatch and Acción Ecológica. Nonetheless, 
the Correa government implemented the initiative the year before popular approval of the 
2008 constitution. The international compensation component of the initiative was invented 
by the Correa government.
The yasuní Project enjoyed worldwide attention, and academics and activists even began 
speaking of a ‘yasunisation’ in other parts of the world. The yasuní-ITT initiative, together 
with the rights of nature in the Constitution, is undoubtedly among the most important and 
symbolic contributions of Ecuador on a global level. yet international collaboration proved 
to be insufficient (only 0.37% of expected contributions were received) and critical voices 
speculated that it was only a question of time before oil drilling would be initiated.
On 15 August 2013, Correa officially declared the ending of the yasuní-ITT initiative and 
thus gave the green light for oil drilling in this natural park in the Amazon. He claimed it 
was his ‘toughest political decision ever...deeply saddened, albeit with responsibility, I have 
signed the executive decree for the liquidation of the yasuní-ITT trust fund and through it, 
[I] end the initiative,’ Correa said in a televised statement.43 The closure of yasuní-ITT was 
officially established via presidential decree. On 3 October 2013, oil drilling in the yasuní-ITT 
was approved in the National Assembly. Whereas the Amazonian federation of Indigenous 
peoples, CONFENIAE and its national umbrella organisation CONAIE are mobilising against 
the government, some Indigenous groups have shown their support for Correa.
This is a cautionary example of tying a leave-it-in-the-ground policy into a compensation 
scheme: when the compensation fails to ‘pay for the nature’, extraction ensues. The dynamics 
demonstrates how the progressive governments of Latin America typically opt for extraction 
if this is in conflict with ethno-territorial rights.
Raposa/Serra do Sol and Resexs 
during the 2000s Brazil’s Northern, Venezuela-bordering Roraima state had a long-lasting 
ethno-territorial conflict between Indigenous populations backed by the state and large 
rice farmers who had entered Brazil’s largest Indigenous territory, Raposa/Serra do Sol. A 
new governmental decree by President Lula da Silva created an Indian Land in the area in 
2005, and the Supreme Court ordered in 2009 that only Indigenous peoples could inhabit 
the area. In contrast to the earlier role of the state, the president ordered the military to 
intervene to expel agribusiness and other non-Indigenous people from the area (most of 
whom had occupied land recently and speculatively, in order to get bona fide refunds for 
land loss).44 This was a case of both de jure and de facto support for ethno-territorial rights.
So also were the many Extractive units created during the 2000s, exceeding millions of 
hectares and offering de jure rights to ‘traditional people’ (an official ethnic–legal category in 
Brazil) who were already enjoying de facto rights in the areas wherein they cultivated small 
plots of land and collected the usufruct of forests and rivers.45 The mid-2000s was a crucial 
time to enshrine those rights by law, as land grabbing and the new resource boom was 
starting in earnest then. Illegal soya bean and rice plantations and pastures soon covered the 
areas left outside legal protection, such as those areas outside the Resex Tapajós-Arapiuns 
close to the city of Santarém by the Amazon River.
Massive deforestation has taken place since 2005 in that area – but satellite photos attest 
to the fact that the official reservation units where people live have remained mostly forested 
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(although conservation has been even better in Indigenous Lands and other strict-use 
 conservation units).46 Without official legal recognition, which was actually the culmination 
of a major political mobilisation that brought the people living in the area by similar liveli-
hoods together to demand the de facto legalisation of their rights under the constitution, it 
is unlikely that the people could have withstood the onslaught of land grabbers.
A kind of extended cycle of contention may thus be discerned in Brazil,47 where certain 
initial ethno-territorial rights were established in the 1988 Constitution, but were imple-
mented many years later during the Lula da Silva presidency. As one of the present authors 
noted (via insider participant observation between 2005 and 2008), these processes were 
strongly supported by international development cooperation projects gained by the Rubber 
Tapper’s Council (CNS) and the Rural Trade unions (STTRs). These projects helped the riverine 
Amazonian peoples to organise themselves, and the progressive state institutions and actors 
in Brazil to be a part of the embedding process.
Belo Monte
Brazil’s Belo Monte dam project was successfully resisted in the 1980s by local Indigenous 
organisations. However, in the 2000s the project was reinitiated by the Workers’ Party govern-
ments.48 Later investigations by prosecutors have found evidence of large-scale corruption, in 
the form of bribery of political parties by construction and other companies to get the major 
contracts to build the dam.49 The dam will inundate large areas and expel local populations, 
and is already almost complete: parts of the river have dried up, and the impacts have been 
devastating for local inhabitants; they are referred to by public prosecutors as ‘ethnocide’.50 
The project is unconstitutional, in that it was built as a fait accompli before proper licences or 
permits were issued or the affected populations heard.51 The government has not listened to 
the decrees issued by the courts, neither nationally nor internationally. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) issued a demand to the government to immediately 
suspend construction of the dam for violating Indigenous rights.52 This enraged the Brazilian 
government authorities, which responded with a withdrawal of its representatives in the 
IAHCR and in the Organization of the American States (OAS). The ALBA governments have 
been in conflict with the OAS, since the latter accused them of human rights violations (eg 
in the extractive projects discussed in this article).53
The Belo Monte case is a strong example of how constitutions do not matter – specifically, 
how neo-developmentalist agendas, accompanied by murky schemes of vote-buying by 
progressive governments requiring the support of corporations and other parties to pursue 
their compensatory agendas, trump constitutions. However, the resistance – including pros-
ecutors bringing class action suits – has been able to rely on the constitution to postpone 
the imposition of the project and attain a substantial compensatory package in monetary 
terms for the affected populations, in contrast to prior dam projects.54 Nonetheless, such 
compensation is not really valid, given that the violation of human rights – by not listening to 
the Indigenous people – by Belo Monte is worse than it was during the dictatorship, accord-
ing to prosecutors.55 In the case of Belo Monte the outcome was a clear failure in terms of 
ethno-territorial rights to having a voice in decision making – in spite of existing de jure rights.
What seems to be the distinctive feature between the previously discussed cases of Resex 
and Raposa/Serra do Sol in comparison to Belo Monte is that, in the former, the private sector 
was the one violating ethno-territorial rights. The affected people could thus refer to the 
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constitution to ask for executive intervention from a progressive government. In Belo Monte 
the government was the violator. Consequently, the resistance was ineffective vis-à-vis the 
bending of law by the government.
Zapatistas and other de facto movements
 There are cases in Latin America that fall outside the dynamics described above, wherein 
states play a key role. One such is the case of the Zapatistas, who unilaterally and successfully 
created an ethnic-territory, with its own human rights in Chiapas, Mexico, in 1994. For the 
Zapatistas the constitution of Mexico did not really matter.
On a smaller scale Latin America is replete with similar cases, where popular mass move-
ments occupy territories in a way that depends less on constitutions and more on direct 
action land reform. The Brazilian landless movements, such as the MST and Indigenous 
groups that have replicated their model of forging contentious agency are other examples 
of this tendency of more de facto- than de jure-based land claiming.56 In Espírito Santo, 
the Indigenous people replicated the MST model and cut down thousands of hectares of 
eucalyptus to occupy land. Thus they attained success: the Lula government recognised 
their claim.57 This was considered an even stronger victory than Raposa/Serra do Sol by the 
Brazilian Indigenous people’s movement, because the struggle was so tough, the opponent 
so powerful and the odds so remote in Espírito Santo in comparison to Roraima (whose rice 
farmers were of little importance to the state, in comparison to the pulp-exporting Aracruz 
company).
The recognition of ethno-territorial rights in contexts without conflict with corporate or 
state extractivists is relatively easy, but ensuring this outcome amid conflict is no easy feat. 
In fact, only when movements have concomitantly used all possible strategies available have 
they succeeded in this goal in Latin American pulp conflicts.58 The particular reasons why the 
Espírito Santo de facto mobilisation led to a de jure recognition, and the de jure recognition 
in Roraima led to de facto (state-backed) rights, may vary depending on specific contexts 
and the sectors concerned. Future research should make a more detailed and systematic 
comparison between cases. What is clear is that the presence of progressive constitutions 
neither hinders nor makes it harder to attain rights, and that the pursuance of de facto rights 
by direct land occupations appears to be an effective strategy. Action comes first, and con-
stitutions and other structures are among the political and discursive resources that social 
actors can use in their struggles for land rights.
Mapuche
The Chilean Mapuche case of neither de jure nor de facto rights illustrates how the (inter-)
cultural context strongly influences the attainment of ethno-territorial rights. Considered 
important actors in the resistance to the Pinochet regime, the Mapuche were promised 
large ethno-territorial rights and constitutionally guaranteed and self-regulated Indian affairs 
institutions. Nevertheless, these promises were largely unfulfilled, partly as a consequence of 
industrial tree plantation encroachment on Mapuche territories.59 Chile continues to apply 
its laws in a discriminatory manner. As reflected in a recent blog article:
One of the worst factors in keeping state–indigenous tensions near boiling point has been 
the continued application of a controversial anti-terrorist law, created during the military 
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dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet (1973–1990), which is more or less only ever used 
against indigenous protesters and activists, and leads to secret court hearings and harsh pun-
ishments…despite the return to democracy in 1990, successive governments have used this 
law in attempts to quell indigenous protests, despite continued pledges not to do so.60
As an organic document, the Chilean constitution cannot be said to offer ethno-territorial 
rights. If such rights were truly recognised in the constitution (seen as an organic document), 
the situation would change dramatically. However, the majority of the Chilean population is 
relatively unconcerned by Mapuche issues. The case suggests that both de jure and de facto 
rights are easier for Indigenous and other ethnically defined populations to achieve if the 
overall intercultural context is not racist and where there is a notion of Indigenous people 
being at the same time native and national. This is the case, for example, in Brazil,61 where 
Indigenous and other rural groups seek to embed the state and self-identify according to 
both the specific ethnic identity and the Brazilian nationality. This dynamic is visible in dif-
fering sub-variations throughout much of Latin America.
Future research framework
The discrepancy between the state’s and the private sector’s extractivist initiatives in Latin 
America has led to a new wave in the 2010s of large landholders and other entities engaged 
in resource extraction to flexibilise the existing constitutions’ ethno-territorial rights. The 
private sector extractivists would not go to the trouble of changing the law if the law did not 
matter for them; in other words if it was not an obstacle. Perhaps the biggest significance 
of constitutions unfolds when we look at them from the viewpoint of government leeway. 
If not backed by a progressive constitution, a progressive government will soon be labelled 
authoritarian if it does the kind of thing that President Lula did with Raposa/Serra do Sol.
Progressive constitutions thus seem to offer a convenient tool for these new governments 
to defend their actions against the backlash by the old elite and conservative forces fearing 
the mobilisation of environmentally conscious rural groups, whose land demands are in 
direct conflict with their own. In our cases, however, constitutions do not seem to signify 
that governments must follow them. Nevertheless, progressive constitutions have been 
highly usable, politically, for progressive governments: they can defend themselves against 
De facto 
De jure 
De facto 
De jure 
Legal pre-
dominance
Figure 2
Moving
boundary  
Figure 1 
De facto 
De jure 
Reduced
legal
exigency 
Figure 3 
Figure 1-3. ethno-territorial rights and change in de jure-recognition. aNote: The authors are most grateful 
to eduardo Gudynas for the proposal to include these figures and for other constructive comments on 
a previous draft of the article.
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their elite critics by saying that they are just obeying the laws and executing them – not 
addressing radical movement demands.
These linkages should be more thoroughly theorised. In particular, the role of the interna-
tional arena (in ‘having a say’) should be revisited. While the Brazilian government listened to 
the strong pressure placed on it at the end of the 1980s in the rubber tapper–cattle-herder 
conflict, in the 2010s the government listened little to similar international demands not to 
proceed with Belo Monte and similar projects in the Amazon. We assume that this discrep-
ancy has to do with the changed world political arena, where the rise of BRICS to a strength-
ened position in the emerging multipolar world order has made them less susceptible to 
such international pressure. This increased domestic autonomy suggests that international 
cooperation has less impact now, and that existing provisions, such as progressive constitu-
tions created before the current era, are more important tools for movements. The current 
era thus justifies our looking primarily at domestic dynamics.
In relation to the dynamics analysed above it is possible to bring Table 1 a step further, in 
order to demonstrate how temporality and changes in de jure constitutional rights affect local 
situations. Figure 1 illustrates how the relationship between de facto and de jure rights can 
be conceived as a moving boundary in the broader Latin American progressive state–social 
movement impulsion of ethno-territorial rights. Figure 2 reflects the situation of the late 
2000s, when the moving boundary between de jure and de facto rights had increased, so that 
there were more de jure rights. Consequently, there is a reduction of the proportion of people 
enjoying de facto rights only, in comparison to the prior period. Figure 2 thus illustrates a 
case of legal predominance. Figure 3, on the other hand, illustrates the current situation of 
the mid-2010s, where strong extractivism has resulted in the weakening of several socio-en-
vironmental protection laws, and an increased level of flexibility to provide legal space for 
state and corporate extraction. In Figure 3 the bar of de jure rights is lowered, which means 
that the legal exigency is reduced. In situations of reduced de jure rights and legal elasticity, 
the state and companies may still argue that they respect legal ethno-territorial rights.
Figures 1–3 can serve as a heuristic framework for future research to assess what factors 
make the boundary move up or down, and with what consequences. The yasuni-ITT case – 
after 2013 with the decision to move ahead with oil drilling – is a clear example of moving 
boundaries. As a result of the massive extractivist and developmentalist pressure and in 
order to be able to fulfil their social and economic commitments, progressive governments 
have found themselves obliged to modify the scope of the de jure dimension.62
Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed contemporary ethno-territorial rights in Latin America during 
the recent wave of neo-constitutionalism in the continent, characterised by an expansion 
in the field of rights. Our analysis includes the commodity boom coinciding with the rise of 
progressive Latin American governments and considers the dependence on export incomes 
to finance the provision of welfare politics. In practice ethnically defined territorial rights 
have often been subordinated in relation to economic development policies. Our focus on 
the progressive governments of Bolivia and Ecuador has been complemented by scenarios 
of struggle for ethno-territorial rights amid extractive industries in other Latin American 
countries. Through a review of exemplary cases throughout Latin America, we have analysed 
the (de jure) rights on paper versus the (de facto) rights in practice.
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We have also discussed the importance of the focus on ethno-territorial rights in specific 
cases for a more comprehensive understanding of the role of geopolitical changes and 
increasing South–South cooperation. We found that there are broad similarities in the pro-
cesses of South–South cooperation inside Latin America that have contributed to: 
(1)  de jure creation of ethno-territorial rights, indirectly by a South–South dynamics 
(inside Latin American progressive constitutionalism) and directly by politics in sev-
eral national settings;
(2)  de facto taking or securing of rights by local socio-environmental communities 
across the area, which is also part of a broader networking and of building of a 
Latin American alternative.
All our examples included a significant degree of cross-border relations and networking, Latin 
America-wide intellectual currents, intellectuals, activists and progressive politicians being 
rather Pan-Latin American than national (networks including Via Campesina, CLOC, COICA, 
ALBA, unasur and the Buen vivir ‘platform’). Latin American South–South cooperation is also 
markedly intercultural and takes place very much at the level of civil society and popular 
movements, not just at the level of states.
The de facto results of securing ethno-territorial rights are outcomes of social move-
ment-level direct action and the spread of contentious agency on a continental scale, while 
the de jure-outcomes tell us that the expansion of these rights is also a ‘top-level’ official 
policy cooperative project enshrined in progressive constitutionalism, which has common 
roots, shared dynamics and impulses. Among these are the shared roads away from dicta-
torships, as well as the linkage back to a common history as colonies and the redeeming of 
historical wrongs.
Constitutions did matter in almost all of our cases, the Zapatista case being an exception – 
but even this is debatable, given the ethno-territorial rights, decentralisation and regional 
autonomy clauses in the Mexican constitution, possibly supporting their de facto land rights. 
However, a constitution that provides ethno-territorial rights is neither sufficient by itself, 
nor a necessary causal condition for local populations to attain autonomy or local land con-
trol. We also found that constitutions function differently for local populations depending 
on who the extractivist agent is. The de jure function works better when communities face 
private sector extractivism than when confronting land grabbing conducted by the state 
(or actors closely associated with the state, such as key commodity exporters). In situations 
in which the private sector violates ethno-territorial rights, the affected people and national 
and transnational movements or networks could refer to the constitution to ask for executive 
intervention from a progressive government. But, when the government was the protago-
nist (eg Belo Monte and yasuní after 2013), social movement resistance was insufficient to 
prevent the bending of law by the state.
Governments are compromised by international relations of diplomacy and trade. 
Frequently, as has been argued, international demands for the protection of ethno-territo-
rial rights are ignored by governments in Latin America (as elsewhere). The world of today 
has become more multipolar, and the relative power of the global South has increased, 
although the reinforcement of the South’s global position leans (heavily) on a strategy of 
accumulation by dispossession, which clashes with ethno-territorial rights.
For whom do constitutions matter? The results indicate that the new progressive con-
stitutions are useful for movements in conflict with private corporations, particularly 
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multinationals, whose operations are not liked by the progressive governments. They also 
offer governments the ability to show that they and their economies are operating in an 
ethical environment. If de jure rights are lowered and socio-environmental laws stretched, as 
is currently happening across the global South (including Latin America) as a legislative result 
of the global commodity boom, the corporate and state extractivists can say that they are 
obeying legal norms. We see two reasons for the increased flexibilisation of forest, mining and 
other laws across the region. First, progressive constitutions have allowed social movements 
the possibility to more effectively address the problems of land grabbing and other territorial 
disputes, and to make progressive governments execute the law. Progressive constitutions 
thus provide tools for social struggle and opportunities for constructive debate on conten-
tious issues. Second, the increased international criticism that the progressive extractivist 
governments have received, eg from the OAS and its IACHR, concerning extractive projects 
that violate the countries’ own constitutions and international human rights,63 has troubled 
these states. Therefore they feel obliged to stretch the interpretation of the constitutional 
principles in order to retain their international reputation as progressive.
So when and how do constitutions matter? The principles of the constitution need to 
be accepted as the only game in town. In order to function, constitutions must be socially 
anchored, and reinforced by detailed secondary legislation. Constitutions also require cor-
relation with state development policies. The general political dynamics should also be such 
that stakeholders are involved in decision-making procedures at local level. In this sense 
constitutions are just a framework, which needs to be supplemented by other factors to 
secure ethno-territorial rights. However, as has been emphasised in this paper, if there are 
contradicting messages and principles in one and the same constitution, then the outcome 
of each conflictive scenario will be more uncertain. In practice, economic development 
politics tend to be superior to ethno-territorial rights, even in the contexts of progressive 
governments.
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Notes
1.  The ethno-territorial areas mostly already existed before being legally recognised. A few 
examples from Brazil are Resex Tapajós-Arapiuns (over 700,000 ha) and Resex Verde para 
Sempre (over one million ha), both of which had traditional populations living off the rainforest 
in the Amazon, and the Indigenous Land of Raposo/Serra do Sol (the largest ethno-territorial 
legal unit in Latin America, possibly in the world). There are also counter-tendencies, such as 
in Peru, where legal rights were withdrawn in the mid-1990s (Ley de la tierra 26505).
2.  Both constitutions are strongly inspired by the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1989) and the united Nations declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).
3.  Lalander, “The Ecuadorian Resource dilemma”; and Lalander, “Entre el ecocentrismo y el 
pragmatismo ambiental.”
4.  See Fontana, “Indigenous Peoples vs. Peasant unions.” In Latin America during historical land 
reform processes the nation-states have generally referred to all rural citizens and collectives 
as ‘peasants’ (campesinos). The rights obtained during these processes are simply territorial, 
not ethno-territorial.
5.  For theoretical discussions on transnational activism and the internationalisation of social 
movements, see, for instance, Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism; and Tarrow, Power in 
Movement.
6.  Flesher Fominaya, Social Movements & Globalization, 64–66.
7.  Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past; and Ortiz-T., “Justicia comunitaria y pluralismo 
jurídico en América Latina.”
8.  Mexico (1990), Bolivia and Colombia (1991), Costa Rica and Paraguay (1993), Peru (1994), 
Honduras (1995), Guatemala (1996), Ecuador (1998), Argentina (2000) and Brazil, Venezuela 
and dominica (2002).
9.  Hale, “Neoliberal Multiculturalism.” The first phase of neoliberal multiculturalism saw the 
constitutional reforms of Bolivia (1994) and Ecuador (1997–98) strongly shaped by ILO-169 
on the rights of Indigenous peoples. The new progressive constitutions of Ecuador (2008) and 
Bolivia (2009) were then further motivated by the uN declaration of the rights of Indigenous 
peoples (2007).
10.  Schilling-Vacaflor and Kuppe, “Plurinational Constitutionalism.”
11.  Escobar, “Latin America at a Crossroads.” Post-neoliberalism might still refer to a system of 
capitalist logics, but post-developmentalism is a radical critique of growth and ‘progress’. See 
Gudynas, “El postdesarrollo como crítica.”
12.  Nolte and Schilling-Vacaflor, New Constitutionalism in Latin America.
13.  Schilling-Vacaflor, “Prior Consultations in Plurinational Bolivia.”
14.  Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism; and Tarrow, Power in Movement.
15.  yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America, 294.
16.  Van Cott, “Constitutional Reform in the Andes.”
17.  These acronyms stand, respectively, for: the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – 
Peoples’ Trade Agreement (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado 
de Comercio de los Pueblos); the union of South American Nations (unión de Naciones 
Suramericanas); and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de 
Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños).
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18.  However, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are far from being socialist societies. Nevertheless, a 
high number of far-reaching reforms can be traced to socialist ideology, as also the possibilities 
of popular participation beyond the representative state authorities, particularly in Venezuela.
19.  Kröger, “Neo-mercantilist Capitalism.”
20.  Gudynas, “El nuevo extractivismo progresista en América del Sur”; and Rosales, “Going 
underground.”
21.  This is exemplified by the cases of the Bolivian Constitution of 2009 and the Ecuadorian 
Constitution of 2008. See Lalander, “The Ecuadorian Resource dilemma”; and Lalander “Entre 
el ecocentrismo y el pragmatismo ambiental.”
22.  Kröger, Contentious Agency and Natural Resource Politics; and Vergara-Camus, “Neoliberal 
Globalization.”
23.  Gudynas, “Estado compensador e nuevos extractivismos.”
24.  dávalos, “‘No podemos ser mendigos sentados en un saco de oro’.” However, dávalos does 
not agree that post-2007 Ecuador should be labelled progressive, because, as a percentage of 
the extractive revenues, the share dedicated to social welfare shows a relative decrease. Ibid.
25.  Gudynas, “Estado compensador e nuevos extractivismos.”
26.  See Gudynas, “Buen Vivir”; and Lalander, “Entre el ecocentrismo y el pragmatismo ambiental.”
27.  For example, as regards the issue of nationalisation of vital industries – mainly hydrocarbons, 
agri-business and mining – the Bolivian Constitution declares the industrialisation and 
commercialisation of natural resources to be a key priority of the state, albeit taking into 
consideration the rights of nature and of Indigenous peoples and provided that revenues 
are directed at the common good (art. 355). This is also a central policy of the Ecuadorian 
government, to a large extent backed up by the 2008 Constitution (eg in articles 275, 276, 
277, 313, 314, 317 and 395–399), in subsequent legislation and in the National development 
Plan. See Lalander, “The Ecuadorian Resource dilemma”; and Lalander “Entre el ecocentrismo 
y el pragmatismo ambiental.”
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